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TP 8294

Marine Casualty Investigations

Enquêtes sur les accidents maritimes



Canada

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FISHING VESSELS

Summaries of Reports of Investigations
into Marine Casualties and Accidents
Aboard Ships

Issue No. 10 April 1990

Summaries of Fishing Vessel Marine Casualties and Accidents

This publication summarizes the Reports of Investigation into marine casualties and/or marine accidents involving fishing vessels which were investigated by the Marine Casualty Investigations Division of Transport Canada and is published three times a year. There is another publication covering commercial vessels and other craft.

Note:

1. A glossary of terms and abbreviations used can be found at the end of this publication.

2. Unless stated otherwise, all times mentioned in this publication are local times.

3. Unless stated otherwise, all Regulations referred to in this publication are made pursuant to the Canada Shipping Act.

4. Unless stated otherwise, all vessels referred to in this publication are Canadian.

The full report of the summaries contained herein may be obtained by writing to:

Director
Marine Casualty Investigations
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Room 800
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Ottawa, Ontario
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Their contents may be deficient and misleading if used in any other process and are not to be used or admitted in evidence in any legal proceedings, either civil or criminal, arising out of any casualty described therein. The statements, opinions and findings in the reports and summaries are those of the Marine Casualty Investigations Division only and do not constitute admissions made by or on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada.

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"MELISSA S" / "STEPHANIE JOY III"
Collision off south-west coast of Nova Scotia,
March 20, 1989

Summary

"MELISSA S"

The 13 gross ton, 10.42 m long Canadian lobster fishing vessel "MELISSA S" is constructed of GRP and was fitted with a passive radar reflector. Her navigation equipment included a radar, echo sounder, Loran C, VHF R/T and a magnetic compass. The vessel, with a crew of 3 and loaded with some 120 lobster traps on the well deck aft, departed Bear Point, N.S. at 0515, March 20, 1989 bound for the fishing grounds some 18 miles to the south-west. The operator had the conduct of the vessel and a deck-hand maintained a look-out.

Winds were calm, sea smooth, visibility unlimited and it was twilight. Reportedly, the vessel was displaying her navigation lights and heading generally in a SW'ly direction at her economical speed of about 6 knots.

Some 30 minutes later, the deck-hand advised the operator that another vessel, later identified to be the "STEPHANIE JOY III", was close astern some 10 m on the port side; the latter being an overtaking vessel. The speed of "MELISSA S" was increased in an attempt to pass ahead but this action was too late and both vessels were involved in a collision; the stem of the "STEPHANIE JOY III" contacted the "MELISSA S" 3/4 th of her length from forward on the port side. The force of the impact caused the "MELISSA S" to turn to port which allowed the "STEPHANIE JOY III" to continue past the former's stern. Fearing that her hull had been breached and that she may possibly founder, all lobster traps were jettisoned.

"STEPHANIE JOY III"

The 27 gross ton, 11.09 m long lobster fishing vessel of GRP construction "STEPHANIE JOY III" was fitted with a passive radar reflector. Her navigation equipment included a radar, echo sounder, Loran C, VHF R/T and a magnetic compass. The vessel, with a crew of 2, departed West Head, N.S. at 0510, March 20, 1989 bound for the fishing grounds some 16 miles to the west. The vessel headed in a generally W'ly direction at an economical speed of about 8 knots with only the skipper in the wheel-house; the deck-hand was preparing bait on the well deck aft. Some 20 minutes later without warning and without having sighted any vessel, she was involved in a collision with the "MELISSA S".

Events following the collision

Following collision both vessels were stopped; their damage

assessed and information exchanged. Both vessels then proceeded to Bear Point. The "MELISSA S" sustained damage estimated at $500 while there were only scratches to the other. There was no injury or pollution as a result.

Findings

The "STEPHANIE JOY III" and the "MELISSA S" collided at sea off Cape Sable Island, N.S. while in good weather and visibility conditions during hours of darkness and while the "STEPHANIE JOY III" was overtaking the "MELISSA S".

It would appear that the contributing factors to the collision were as follow:

"MELISSA S"

- did not utilize the radar to obtain early warning and to determine if risk of collision existed; and

- did not keep a proper look-out inasmuch as the approach of the "STEPHANIE JOY III" was not visually detected in sufficient time to avert a risk of collision.

"STEPHANIE JOY III"

- did not utilize the radar to obtain early warning and to determine if risk of collision existed;

- did not keep a proper look-out inasmuch as the responsibility for all watchkeeping duties impeded the sole occupant of the wheel-house;

- did not utilize the deck-hand in a look-out capacity; and

- did not take the appropriate avoiding action.

Other Findings

After leaving harbour, the "MELISSA S" did not ensure that her navigation lights were properly exhibited.

The "MELISSA S" carried none of the statutory hull markings.

Neither vessel carried a copy of the Code of Nautical Procedures and Practices.



SKETCH INDICATING RELATIVE POSITIONS OF VESSELS AT TIME OF COLLISION WITH THE "STEPHANIE JOY III" INVOLVED IN AN OVERTAKING SITUATION WITH THE "MELISSA S"

CROQUIS MONTRANT LES POSITIONS RELATIVES DES BATEAUX AU MOMENT DE L'ABORDAGE AVEC LE "STEPHANIE JOY III" IMPLIQUÉ DANS UNE SITUATION DE RATTRAPAGE AVEC LE "MELISSA S"

G GREEN / VERT

R RED / ROUGE

W WHITE / BLANC

"MELISSA S"/ "STEPHANIE JOY III"

SECTION OF CHS CHART No.4242 — SECTION DE LA CARTE N°4242 DU SHC

DEPTHS IN METRES — PROFONDEURS EN MÈTRES

"SILVER ICE"

Loss overboard of one crew member and injuries to another during a gale in Queen Charlotte Sound, B.C., March 26, 1989.

Summary

The American vessel "SILVER ICE" is a twin screw, former offshore drilling unit supply vessel/mud tender, converted for use as a longliner/processing vessel. She is 188 gross tons and is of welded steel construction with accommodation, bait freezer room, bridge and engine-room located aft, and two freezer holds and a processing house forward. The vessel has a well deck immediately forward of the house with the fishing station located at the forward starboard side. The bulwarks did not extend far enough forward into the fishing area to afford sufficient protection in way of the change of levels. The centre portion of the vessel housing the processing area is raised and steps down a half deck to the forecastle deck.

The "SILVER ICE" departed from Seattle, Washington, U.S.A., on the morning of March 25, 1989 with a crew of 15, bound for Ketchikan and Dutch Harbour, Alaska to engage in black cod fishing in the Gulf of Alaska. After passing abeam of Pine Island, Gordon Channel at 1140, March 25 and upon entering Queen Charlotte Sound, she encountered an ESE'ly gale with moderate seas and the vessel was rolling about 15° with occasional rolls to 20°. Her freeboard was 0.6 m in the vicinity of the well deck fishing area however, she was not shipping seas on deck.

Five seamen completed baiting fish hooks and stowed them in No. 2 freezer hold; only the engineer, Mr. Moore, remained on the well deck. At about 1800, whilst heading on a NNW'ly course and riding comfortably in moderate/rough following seas, quarterly swells and strong to gale force ESE'ly winds, she 'broached to'. Just as the engineer stepped out of the house onto the well deck, a large wave broke green seas over the vessel sweeping Mr. Moore overboard and injuring the engineer. The engineer had been knocked unconscious and was recovered hanging over the forward starboard bulwarks some 7 m from where he had stood. The master's quarters and wheel-house windows were broken, causing flooding and subsequent damage to electrical equipment and navigation appliances.

RCC Victoria was notified thus initiating official SAR response but darkness and weather conditions hindered search effort. The seaman remains missing and is presumed drowned.

The "SILVER ICE" which lost power to her steering was towed to Shearwater, B.C. for repairs arriving there on of March 27. The injured seaman was taken to hospital in Bella Bella where



"SILVER ICE"

REDUCED SECTION OF CHS CHART No.3000

SECTION RÉDUITE DE LA CARTE N°3000 DU SHC

DEPTHS IN FATHOMS

PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES

he was treated for four fractured ribs and flown to Seattle for further treatment. The cost of repairs and replacing electronic equipment was in the order of $25,000.00 U.S.

Findings

On the evening of March 26, 1989 in daylight, whilst weathering a gale in Queen Charlotte Sound, the U.S. fishing vessel "SILVER ICE" 'broached to' and a freak wave broke green seas over the vessel causing one seaman to be lost overboard and the ship's engineer to sustain injuries.

It would appear that:

- the heavy seas taken on deck were unexpected;
- upon the freak wave approaching the vessel, immediate corrective helm was not possible as the vessel was on auto-pilot, thus allowing her to 'broach-to';
- the men were standing where they were afforded no protection or hand-hold capability;
- the deluge of water swept the men to an area where the well deck bulwarks did not extend far enough to afford protection in way of the change of deck levels; and
- the low deck in the fishing well served as a natural drainage area for the flow of shipped seas on the well deck.

It would further appear that, having fallen overboard, Mr. Moore lost his life due to the following contributing factors:

- there was a lapse of several minutes before the victim was discovered missing and the vessel turned around to commence her search;
- the cold water, lack of a flotation device and turbulent seas limited his survival time; and
- he may have been seriously injured or rendered unconscious before entering the water.

Other Findings

The vessel's auto-pilot was not totally functional since the 'weather' and 'rudder' conditions were inoperative.

"SILVER ICE"



HANDRAILS FITTED
AFTER ACCIDENT

RAMBARDE INSTALLÉE
APRÈS L'ACCIDENT

ENGINEER RECOVERED

MÉCANICIEN RETROUVÉ

"ANNETTE MARIE"

Fire & sinking on Georges Bank, N.S., March 30, 1989.

Summary

The 163 gross ton, 27.16 m scallop dragger, "ANNETTE MARIE", with a crew of 15, had sailed from Lunenburg, N.S., March 20, 1989, for the Georges Bank fishing ground. The vessel had commenced fishing early morning March 21 and had continued fishing without incident until the fire. However, it was reported that the condition of the connections on each end of the fuel line between the fuel ring line and the recently-installed winch-engine was such that it was necessary to tighten them every few hours; also there had been a leak in one of the fuel tanks in the engine-room. The engine-room was unmanned as the chief engineer was at the winch controls. At 1520, March 30, she had just set her fishing gear, with 135 fathoms of warp out to each rake on either side. The winch-engine was then shut off from the bridge.

Upon entering the accomodation, the engineer smelt smoke which had an odour of burning hydraulic fluid. He entered the engine-room and shut off the main engine. He noticed that flames were coming from the area of the reduction gear of the winch-engine located at the forward starboard end of the engine-room.

The skipper was immediately called and after assessing the situation ordered the engine-room sealed and halon 1301 from the vessel's fire smothering system released into the space. Nearby fishing vessels were advised by radio of the situation.

Reportedly, after 10 minutes, the engine-room door was briefly opened for a quick look and then closed. Some 35 minutes later, the skipper, wearing a self-contained breathing apparatus, then entered the engine-room and released the contents of two dry-chemical fire extinguishers on the fire. A single air bottle for the breathing apparatus precluded further inspection of the fire. By the time another fishing vessel with air bottle arrived on-scene, the fire had become more intense and it was not possible to re-enter the engine-room.

At about 1644, the crew abandoned the "ANNETTE MARIE" by liferaft and shortly thereafter were taken on board by another fishing vessel, the "SHARON DAWN II". Around 2235, the "ANNETTE MARIE" sank in position 41°43'N 66°20'W.

There was no injury to any person as a result of this casualty. Some minor pollution may have resulted from about 4,500 L of diesel fuel remaining on board the vessel.



"ANNETTE MARIE"

SECTION OF CHS CHART No.4001

SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 4001 DU SHC

DEPTHS IN METRES

PROFONDEURS EN MÈTRES

The vessel was typically valued at some 1/2 million dollars with an estimated replacement value of 1 1/2 million dollars.

Findings

The "ANNETTE MARIE" caught fire and subsequently sank on Georges Bank on March 30, 1989. The cause of the fire remains undetermined but is known to have started in the vicinity of the reduction gear on the winch-engine in the engine-room. The fire may have been caused by one of the following factors:

- leakage of diesel, hydraulic or lubricating oil from nearby fuel couplings, pipes or hoses onto a hot surface on or in the vicinity of the reduction gear on the winch-engine; or

- fire from unknown cause in the electrical wiring between the batteries and the engine.

After release of the Halon in the engine-room to extinguish the fire, the following factors may have contributed to the subsequent spread of fire and eventual loss of the vessel:

- the opening of the engine-room door for inspection some 10 minutes following the release of the Halon allowed oxygen to enter the space; and

- the non-availability of a spare air bottle for the breathing apparatus precluded subsequent close quarter fire-fighting capability.

Other finding

The skipper abandoned the vessel with the liferaft painter tied around his waist, a potentially hazardous method.

Neither the skipper, nor the chief mate nor the chief engineer had taken a Marine Emergency Duties course.

The crew made all possible efforts to fight the fire with the equipment at hand.

"SHARON DAWN II", a sister vessel to the "ANNETTE MARIE".

"SHARON DAWN II", bateau jumeau du "ANNETTE MARIE".



hydraulic pipes pump.

tuyaux des pompes hydrauliques.

winch motor.

moteur du treuil.

main engine.

moteur principal.

View of engine-room starboard side looking forward.

Vue de la salle des machines vers l'avant.

"SAMSON"

Death of a fish farm worker, Quadra Island, B.C.,
April 16, 1989.

Summary

The 150 gross ton, non-self-propelled barge "SAMSON" was equipped with a diesel engine driven fixed boom crane, a diesel/electric power plant, and two fish pen net cleaning units. The tackle was in good working order but the mandatory inspection by the Coast Guard had not been carried out. The "SAMSON", on-site at the fish farm since March 26, 1989, had been utilized in raising from the sea some 50 fouled (dirty) fish pen nets.

At about 1000, April 14, 1989, in good weather and on virtually calm waters, the "SAMSON" was secured alongside fish pens Nos. 83 and 84 to raise a fouled net hanging from the walkway between pens Nos. 82 and 83 (see figure 1). The net was suspended from the walkway on two lines, one fastened to loops on the top circumference of the net and secured to the walkway, and the other fastened to similar loops on the net leading up to a float and thence upwards and secured to the walkway (see figure 2).

Mr. Lewis and another worker, wearing hard-hats and PFDs were in attendance on the walkway as the crane boom was being positioned over the fouled net. They released the two lines from the walkway and secured the line attached directly to the net on to a short chain loop on the lifting hook. The float line was then released from the walkway.

At about 1010, Mr. Lewis went on board the "SAMSON" in readiness for a subsequent procedure in the lifting operation while the crane was being repositioned at the stern of the "SAMSON". As the crane hook was raised and some 3-3.5 m length of the net was out of the water, the float was picked up by the two entangled lines some 7.6 m above the deck. As the crane hook had to be repositioned, Mr. Lewis obtained a short rope sling (choker) and approached the stern of the barge to secure the sling around the suspended portion of the net. While Mr. Lewis was so occupied, the crane operator noticed the float slip and shouted a warning to Mr. Lewis. Due to the noise of the crane engine and/or the speed with which the float fell, Mr. Lewis was unable to heed the warning, was struck by the falling float and having sustained body and head injuries collapsed on the deck. The crane operator, upon noticing the severity of the head injuries, immediately summoned assistance. Attempts to revive Mr. Lewis were unsuccessful and he was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital in Campbell River.



DIAGRAMMATIC ARRANGEMENT OF ACCIDENT SITE

PLAN SCHÉMATIQUE DES LIEUX DE L'ACCIDENT


WALKWAY
PASSAGES
FLOAT
MADE FROM STYROFOAM AND REINFORCED WITH LUMBER AND STEEL BOLTS APPROXIMATE WEIGHT 70 kg
FLOTTEURS
FABRIQUÉ DE MOUSSE POLYSTYRÈNE EXPANSÉ, PUIS RENFORCÉ DE BOIS ET DE BOULONS EN ACIER. LE POID APPROXIMATIF EST DE 70 kg ENVIRON
APPROXIMATE POSITIONS OF LINES WHEN FIRST SUSPENDED
POSITIONS APPROXIMATIVES DES FILINS AU MOMENT DE LEURS SUSPENSIONS
STATE OF LINES 5 MONTHS LATER DUE TO EFFECT OF TIDE AND CURRENT
ÉTAT DES FILINS 5 MOIS PLUS TARD CAUSÉ PAR L'EFFET DES COURANTS ET MARÉES
FISH PEN NET
FILETS DU PARC À POISSON

DIAGRAMMATIC ARRANGEMENT OF ENTANGLEMENT OF NET AND FLOAT LINES

PLAN SCHÉMATIQUE DE L'ENCHEVÊTREMENT DES FILETS ET DES FILINS POUR LES FLOTTEURS

Findings

On April 14, 1989, while the crane on board the barge "SAMSON" was being used to raise a fouled fish pen net, a large marker float was inadvertently lifted 7.6m (25 ft) above the deck entangled with the rope being used to raise the net. The float was not properly secured and subsequently came loose, fell and fatally injured Mr. Lewis.

It is considered that the following factors contributed to the accident:

- the float was not removed prior to raising the net;
- the float was not secured to the crane hook prior to raising the net; and
- none of the personnel engaged in the operation gave due recognition to the hazard created by the insecure attachment of the float.

Other Findings

The crane had not been inspected and tested by the appropriate authority, nor had safe working loads (lifting capacities) been assigned for the use of the crane on board a ship. However, such non-compliance was not a contributing factor in the accident.


LOUGHBOROUGH
INLET
PHILLIPS
ARM
Frederick
Arm
Lawrence Pt
Fawn Bluff
ISLANDS
Sonora Island
Cameron
Harbour
Granite Pt
Maurelle I
Read
Island
QUADRA
ISLAND
DISCOVERY
Hoskyn
Channel
Race Pt
PASSAGE
Orange Pt
Campbell River
Cortes Island
Seaford
Marina I
Redonda
Bay
Raddington
Channel
REDONDA
ISLANDS
HOMFRAY
CHANNEL
DESOLATION
SOUND
Bliss
Landing
Malaspina
Inlet
50°00'N
Lund
Harwood
Vananda
Cape Lazo
Comox
Courtenay
Oyster River
Kuhushan Pt
Sharman
Passage
Algerine
Passage
125°00'W
ACCIDENT LIEU DE
LOCATION L'ACCIDENT
VANCOUVER
VANCOUVER
NANAIMO
ISLAND
VICTORIA
"SAMSON"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No.3001
SECTION DE LA CARTE N°3001 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS
PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES

"CFV 130409"

Operator lost overboard off Alcock Island, Nfld., April 26, 1989.

Summary

The 1989-built, 2 gross ton open speedboat of fibreglass construction was powered by a 45 h.p. Johnson outboard motor and was licensed for lobster fishing. The new vessel was not appropriately equipped with safety equipment.

In preparation for the opening of the upcoming lobster fishing season on May 1, 1989 the boat, with the lone operator on board, departed Leading Tickles, Nfld. at about 1500, April 26, 1989 to continue 'fitting out' lobster traps and placing them at selected sites along the shores to the east of Leading Tickles and on the southern shores of Alcock Island. The seas were calm, skies clear and light northerly winds.

At about 1700, another fisherman enroute to 'fit out' his lobster traps noticed a boat on the shoreline when he passed near the southwestern end of the Alcock Island. When he returned an hour later to land nearby, he recognized Mr. Peddle's boat but there was no one on board. The boat was not secured ashore and seemed to be aground. The boat's painter was coiled in the bow and the foot of the outboard motor was caught on a rock. He then searched the area with negative results. Meanwhile, another fisherman arrived on-scene and whilst the former continued to search, the latter towed Mr. Peddle's boat to Leading Tickles. He then learned that Mr. Peddle was not at home and reported the incident to the Botwood Detachment of the RCMP, who in turn notified MRSC St. Johns thus initiating official SAR response.

Following search of the area, Mr. Peddle's body was subsequently recovered by RCMP divers some 15 m from shore in 10 fathoms of water in the general area in which the boat was found. A subsequent autopsy determined the cause of death to be due to accidental drowning.

Findings

On April 26, 1989, in good weather conditions, some time after 1500, while engaged in visiting sites to 'fit out' his lobster pots, Mr. Ralph Peddle fell from his 5 m open fiberglass boat. In the absence of witnesses to the accident, the reason for his fall cannot be ascertained. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it would appear that the boat may have been aground and while pushing his boat off from the shoreline, using a gaff, he fell overboard into the


55°25.25'W
Woody I.
Green I.
Tanker I.
Red I.
ALCOCK
ISLAND
LEADING TICKLES
30°40'N
POSITION OÙ LE BATEAU A ÉTÉ RETROUVÉ
POSITION BOAT FOUND
"CFV 130409"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No.4594
SECTION DE LA CARTE N°4594 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS
PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES

water.

Subsequent to his fall overboard, Mr Peddle lost his life due to the following contributing factors:

- he was alone and not wearing any form of flotation device;
- he was not a swimmer;
- he wore heavy clothing; and
- the cold water temperature limited his survival time.

Other Findings

The boat was not equipped in accordance with the Small Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations.

"BONNIE GIRL"

Flooding and sinking off Cape Anguille, Nfld.,
May 3, 1989.

Summary

The 14.68 gross ton, 11.89 m long, Newfoundland-Style Canadian longliner "BONNIE GIRL" was built in 1980 and constructed of wood. Her hull was divided into 4 compartments by 3 transverse bulkheads, none of which were watertight. She was equipped with three pumps with a total discharge capacity of 9.94 L/sec; one of which was a main engine-driven self-priming centrifugal pump and the other two were self-priming electric pumps. The vessel was reportedly well maintained and was equipped with appropriate navigation and life-saving equipment.

The vessel, with a crew of 5 and laden with 1000 kg of catch preservation ice, 28 tubs of baited longlines, 1368 L of fuel and water and stores for 4 days, departed Burnt Island, Nfld., at 1400, May 1, 1989 bound for the fishing grounds off Cape Anguille, Nfld. By about 1130, May 3, the vessel had a catch of some 6,800 kg of cod in her fish hold. The weather conditions were clear skies, 6 miles visibility, SSW winds at 20-25 knots and moderate 1.5-3 m seas. When the gear had been retrieved for the last time, the skipper entered the engine-room to disengage the hydraulic gurdy clutch and found an excess amount of water in the bilges; it was apparent that water was finding its way into the engine-room. The skipper immediately activated the main engine-driven bilge pump, followed by the two electric bilge pumps and finally engaged the crew in manual bailing. All efforts to contain the water failed and the skipper notified other vessels in the area and sought assistance. When the deck was awash, the crew, wearing lifejackets, abandoned the vessel into the lifeboat and were eventually rescued by another fishing vessel. The "BONNIE GIRL" sank stern first about 14 miles north-east of Cape Anguille and was a total loss; her estimated value being about $60,000. There was no injury and no pollution was reported.

Findings

As the wooden fishing vessel "BONNIE GIRL" was about to leave the fishing grounds to return to port to discharge her catch of some 6800 kg of fish, she began taking on water from a leak of unknown origin below the waterline and sank approximately 14 nautical miles north-west of Cape Anguille,



APP

SCATARIE ISLA

Nfld., on May 3, 1989. The sinking of the vessel precluded her examination and in the absence of wreckage available for inspection, it was neither possible to determine the precise cause nor the origin of ingress of water, believed to be somewhere in the engine-room. It would appear that the flooding may have been caused by either one or a combination of the following factors:

- the leak developing suddenly;
- there may have been a rupture in the hull planking;
- there may have been a rupture of a through-hull fitting;
- being heavily laden, seams not normally immersed usually tend to dry out and thus possibly permitted an ingress of water worsening the situation;
- the crew were unable to locate its origin to take steps to prevent or control it; and
- the ingress of water exceeded the pumping capacity of the pumps in use.

"SHANE II"/"SECOND CHANCE '83"

Collision off Cape Bear, P.E.I., May 9, 1989.

Summary

"SHANE II"

The 11.77 m long, 9 gross ton, Canadian wooden fishing vessel, "SHANE II", was manned by a crew of 3 and was equipped with 2 depth sounders, a Loran C, a VHF R/T and a magnetic compass. In light southerly winds, rippled sea and reduced visibility in dense fog, she departed Murray Harbour, P.E.I. on May 9, 1989 bound for the lobster fishing ground, locally known as Toby's Bank. After clearing the harbour entrance, courses were adjusted to the south to clear Bear Reef Buoy 'NN2'; the speed of the vessel was about 10 knots. Navigation was from memory using Loran C coordinates. The operator was alone on the bridge engaged in navigation, steering and look-out duties. At about 0545, the vessel's course was altered from Southerly to South-westerly. A few minutes later, a deck-hand on the after deck, upon seeing another vessel appearing out of the fog some 0.5-1 m away, warned the operator. Before any evasive action could be taken, both vessels collided. She sustained extensive damage which allowed rapid ingress of water.

"SECOND CHANCE '83"

The 13 gross ton, 11.7 m long, Canadian wooden fishing vessel, "SECOND CHANCE '83", was manned by a crew of 3 and was equipped with 2 depth sounders, a Loran C, a VHF R/T and a magnetic compass. She departed Beach Point, P.E.I. in dense fog on May 9, 1989 bound for Toby's Bank to collect lobster from traps that had been laid earlier. After clearing the harbour entrance and Bear Reef Buoy 'NN2' courses were adjusted to Southerly and maintained by Loran C co-ordinates; the speed of the vessel was about 8 knots. The operator was alone on the bridge and shortly after 0545, without prior warning a vessel was seen emerging out of the fog very close on her port bow. Her engine was placed in neutral and both vessels collided with the "SECOND CHANCE '83" sustaining superficial damage.

Events following the collision

Upon being informed and realizing that the "SHANE II" was sinking, the "SECOND CHANCE '83" was manoeuvred alongside and the three occupants transferred from the sinking vessel. Another fishing vessel who intercepted the collision message proceeded towards "SHANE II" and towed her to Murray Harbour. The "SHANE II" was subsequently declared a constructive total loss with an approximate replacement value of $35,000.



"SHANE II/SECOND CHANCE '83"

REDUCED SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4404	SECTION RÉDUITE DE LA CARTE N° 4404 DU SHC
SOUNDINGS IN FEET	PROFONDEURS EN PIEDS

Findings

Whilst on passage from their home port of Murray Harbour and Beach Point to Toby's Bank, "SHANE II" and "SECOND CHANCE '83" were involved in a collision during a period of poor visibility on May 9, 1989, due to a failure by both vessels to observe certain provisions of the Collision Regulations.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the collision:

Both Vessels

- neither vessel made any sound signal, nor was any method of doing so available on board either vessel;
- apart from the owner/operator of each vessel looking intermittently through the wheel-house windows, no other look-out was kept;
- both vessels were proceeding at an unsafe speed of 8-10 knots in dense fog;
- the VHF R/T was not used to advantage in that no communication was attempted nor 'security calls' made;
- both vessels were being steered from different sides of their respective wheel-houses had 'blind spots' on different arcs of visibility.

Other Findings

Neither vessel was fitted with a radar reflector, in accordance with the Collision Regulations.

The VHF radio installations aboard "SHANE II" and "SECOND CHANCE '83" were not licenced in accordance with the Radio Act.

Neither owner/operator of either vessel held a Radio-telephone Operator's Restricted Certificate (Maritime), although one of the crew of "SHANE II" did so.

Neither vessel was fitted with radar equipment, nor is there a Regulatory requirement for such vessels.

The casualty was not reported to the authorities as required and the distress/safety information was broadcast on VHF R/T channel 72 instead of the preferred International Distress and Safety calling frequency channel 16.

"SHANE II"

Close view of damage to vessel's side.

Plan rapproché des avaries sur le côté du navire.

"CHAD M"

Loss of the Owner from the Vessel, off Grand Manan Island, N.B., May 19, 1989

Summary

During the morning of May 19, 1989, the owner of the 14.9 gross ton Canadian fishing vessel "CHAD M" and his father were preparing fish weir stakes ashore at Woodwards Cove, N.B. As was their usual practice, the owner would operate his vessel alone, while his father would drive a vehicle to North Head to provide available transportation.

At approximately 1230, the "CHAD M" departed Woodwards Cove towing two rafts of stakes and proceeded to one of the owner's fish weirs. One raft of 14 stakes was moored at the owner's fish weir located off Long Island. The "CHAD M" then proceeded towards the North Head wharf towing a raft of five stakes, which was to be towed to another fish weir at Whale Cove after lunch.

A crew member, who normally assisted the owner, contacted the "CHAD M" at 1245 over VHF radio. At that time it was agreed that the crew member would join the vessel at North Head around 1500.

At approximately 1300, the owner contacted his father over VHF radio, giving his ETA at North Head as 1315. The owner's father met the crew member on the wharf and both observed the "CHAD M" manoeuvring erratically at a distance. Assuming the vessel was searching for a weir stake lost from the tow, the crew member prepared his 4.9 m boat and proceeded to assist the "CHAD M". By 1330, the crew member was attempting to manoeuvre alongside and after observing there was no one at the wheel, he shouted; however, there was no response from the "CHAD M".

The crew member called the owner's father over VHF radio informing him of the situation and then proceeded over the vessel's track to search for the owner.

Within minutes of being advised, the owner's father proceeded to the wharf and, with the operator of another small outboard-powered boat, pursued the "CHAD M". The vessel was boarded at about 1400, in approximate position 44°45'N, 66°45'W and only the owner's dog was found on board.

An extensive search of the area ensued but the victim was not found and at 1846, May 20, 1989, the case was handed


"CHAD M"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4340
SECTION DE LA CARTE N°4340 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS
PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES
APPROXIMATE POSITION OF "CHAD M" AT 14:00 19.05.89
POSITION APPROXIMATIVE DU "CHAD M" À 14:00 LE 19.05.89
APPROXIMATE POSITION OF WEIR
POSITION APPROXIMATIVE DE LA FACINE
CAMPBELLTON
NEW BRUNSWICK
CHATHAM
MONCTON
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
CHARLOTTETOWN
SYDNEY
CAPE BRETON ISLAND
FREDERICTON
NOVA SCOTIA
HALIFAX
YARMOUTH
Northern Head
The Bishop
Ashburton Head
Eel Brook
Eel Lake
Little Lake
Rocky Corner
Fish Head
Hole in the Wall
Whale Cove
North Head
Tartons Corner
Spire
Tower
Sampit C.
Swallow Tail
Net Rocks
Flag Cove
Ohio Pond
Money Cove
Money Cove Bk
Wilson Pond
Dark Harbour
Dark Harbour Pt
David Wass Pond
Chart 4342
44°45'N
St. Lon Island
Bay
Castalia
Mill Brook
Long Island
Blissarrier Bk
Bancroft Pt
High Duck I.
Temple Hill
333 ft
Ragged Pt
Woodwards Cove
Beech Hill
Long Pond
GRAND MANAN
Grand Harbour
Priest Cove
Nantucket Island
66°50'W
66°45'W

over to the RCMP as a 'missing person' case. Local resources continued the search until May 22, with negative results.

As there were no eyewitnesses to the accident and as the body of the victim has not been found, the precise circumstances leading to the accident cannot be ascertained. However, investigation revealed that the victim may have been involved in replacing a wooden chock on the wheel-house top. The process would likely require him to step up on the washboard to apply the epoxy glue and in the process he may have slipped and fallen overboard as the vessel made way through the water.

Findings

The circumstances which resulted in the owner missing from the "CHAD M" are not known, however, the following may have contributed to this accident:

- the owner was the only person on board the vessel;
- the owner may have been standing on the vessel's washboard attempting a repair as the "CHAD M" was making way through the water;
- during this time the owner may have slipped, or fallen overboard as a result of other unknown circumstances; and,
- the owner, a non-swimmer, was not wearing any form of personal flotation device.

"CHAD M"

"CHAD M" view forward, starboard side.
Note platform fitted to washboard.

"CHAD M" vue de l'avant, côte tribord.
Remarquez la plate-forme fixée à la fargue.

"MYSTIC WIND"

Skipper's wife lost overboard, Fraser River, B.C., May 23, 1989.

Summary

The 43 gross ton, 15.48 m long, Canadian fishing vessel "MYSTIC WIND" is of closed construction with wheel-house/-cabin, containing galley, head, stateroom and conning station, forward of amidships. At the time of casualty, the vessel was being utilized for a 5-day family pleasure cruise in the Strait of Georgia.

The vessel, with the skipper at the helm and his wife and 3 children, departed Steveston, B.C., at 1830, May 19, 1989. Weather conditions throughout the week were light winds good visibility and rippled sea. After calling at a number of places, the vessel arrived at the entrance to Fraser River, May 23. At 1210, the autopilot was disengaged and skipper piloted the vessel using manual steering. Upon entering the river, strong currents estimated at 5-6 knots were being experienced and additional counter helm was necessary to keep the vessel on her heading. Between 1215-1225, when the vessel was between buoy 'S1' and 'S6', Mrs. Christianson went on to the afterdeck unnoticed. The spacious afterdeck affords sufficient room for a person to walk around and at the time of casualty was reportedly dry and free of obstacles; the bulwarks in the area were 609.6 mm in height. At about 1225 one of the children who could not locate the mother informed the skipper. After confirming that his wife was not on board, the skipper initiated a search of the area and notified CGRS Vancouver thus initiating official SAR response.

An extensive search of the area ensued and the victim was subsequently located near Gabriola Passage around 1520, May 24. A subsequent autopsy revealed the cause of death was accidental drowning in sea water and a low therapeutic level of Phenobarbital was also found. The victim, a non-swimmer, was wearing seasonal clothing and no PFD.

Findings

On the afternoon of May 23, 1989 while travelling in the upstream direction in the Fraser River, between buoy S6 and buoy S1, the skipper's wife fell overboard from the afterdeck of the "MYSTIC WIND" and drowned, with the body being recovered later.


NOTE: TRACK AND POSITION APPROXIMATE
NOTA: SILLAGE ET POSITION SONT APPROXIMATIVES
VANCOUVER
VANCOUVER ISLAND
NANAIMO
VICTORIA
FRASER R
STURGEON BANK
STEVESTON JETTY
A
POSITION VICTIM FELL OVERBOARD
POSITION OÙ LA VICTIME EST PASSÉE PAR-DESSUS BORD
TRACK OF "MYSTIC WIND"
SILLAGE DU "MYSTIC WIND"
"MYSTIC WIND"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 3490
SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 3490 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN METRES
PROFONDEURS EN MÈTRES
Sand Heads
See CAUTION
Voir ATTENTION
ROBERTS
49°06'N
123°18'W
123°16'W

In the absence of any eyewitness, the precise cause of her falling overboard is unknown; however, it would appear that the following factors may have contributed to the accident:

- the missing person had been feeling weak and drowsy at various times;
- she was taking prescribed medication which may have contributed to her being nauseous;
- this was her first trip in 1989 and she may not have become accustomed to the motion of the vessel;
- the strong currents necessitating in the skipper applying additional counter helm to keep the vessel on course resulted in irregular vessel movement that may have caused the victim to loose balance and possibly fall overboard; and
- the height of the bulwark was only 609.6 mm

Subsequent to falling overboard, it would appear that Mrs. Christianson lost her life due to the following contributing factors:

- the victim was a non-swimmer;
- she was not wearing a lifejacket or personal flotation device (PFD);
- as she was not seen falling overboard, valuable time was lost before she was noticed missing; and
- the engine noise could have prevented any call for help from being heard.

"MYSTIC WIND"



View of the afterdeck.

Vue du pont arrière.

"CONNIE AND CYNTHIA"/"SEVEN KINGS III"

Collision off Glace Bay Harbour Entrance, N.S.
May 30, 1989

Summary

"CONNIE AND CYNTHIA"

The 9 gross ton, 9.11 m Cape Islander "CONNIE AND CYNTHIA" was equipped with a magnetic compass and a VHF R/T. She departed Glace Bay, N.S. at about 0510, May 30, 1989 to retrieve and rebait lobster traps laid earlier. At about 0600, in daylight and good visibility, whilst she was stopped in the water, the owner/operator who was working a lobster trap line observed a vessel approaching on a collision course. He endeavoured to attract attention of the other vessel by standing on top of the cuddy and waving his arms and shouting ; but his attempts were unsuccessful. When collision was imminent, the engine was put to full astern; however, the movement of the vessel was hampered by the lobster trap lines and both vessels collided. She suffered minor damage and repairs were estimated to cost $10,000.

"SEVEN KINGS III"

The 10 gross ton, 8.99 m Cape Islander "SEVEN KINGS III" was equipped with a VHF R/T. She departed Glace Bay in the early hours of May 30, 1989 with a crew of 2. After having attended to a set of lobster traps prior to 0600, she was proceeding in a NW'ly direction at a speed of about 5-6 knots towards a second line of lobster traps. The operator was alone in the wheel-house engaged in steering and maintaining a look-out for vessels and lobster trap marker buoys. Whilst on this short passage, the "CONNIE AND CYNTHIA" was not sighted until moments prior to the collision when evasive action was too late. Both vessels collided when her stem came in contact with the port bow of the "CONNIE AND CYNTHIA". She sustained minor scuff marks to her stem.

Findings

Whilst proceeding from one area to another to tend lobster traps in good weather conditions and daylight, the fishing vessel "SEVEN KINGS III" was involved in a collision with the fishing vessel "CONNIE AND CYNTHIA" which was engaged in hauling her lobster traps.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the collision:

Both Vessels

- the VHF R/T was not used to advantage in that neither vessel attempted to contact the other to arrange a safe


"CONNIE AND CYNTHIA"/
"SEVEN KINGS III"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No.4367
SECTION DE LA CARTE N°4367 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS
PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES
COLLISION POSITION
POSITION DE L'ABORDAGE
See CAUTION No 1
GLACE BAY
Glace Bay
Donkin
Dominion
Bridgeport
Lingan
Little Hd
North Hd
David Head Shoal
Table Hd
Indian Bay
Quarry Pt
Big Glace Bay Lake
Cap Perce
60°00'W
59°50'W
CAMPBELLTON
NEW BRUNSWICK
MONCTON
CHARLOTTETOWN
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
FREDERICTON
NOVA SCOTIA
HALIFAX
YARMOUTH
SYDNEY
CAPE BRETON ISLAND

passage;

"SEVEN KINGS III"

- by not maintaining a "proper look-out", she did not:

  (a) notice the presence of the "CONNIE AND CYNTHIA",

  (b) establish if risk of collision existed, and

  (c) take appropriate action to keep out of the way of the "CONNIE AND CYNTHIA"; and

- in an area where fishing vessels are known to be hampered whilst handling their gear, she did not exercise extra vigilance.

"CONNIE AND CYNTHIA"

- lack of an efficient sound signalling device prevented an audible warning being utilised to attract the attention of "SEVEN KINGS III".

Other Findings

Neither vessel was fitted with a sound signalling device.

"SEVEN KINGS III" did not have on board appropriate life-saving equipment.

The VHF installation on board the "CONNIE AND CYNTHIA" was not licenced.

Neither vessel officially reported the casualty.

"CONNIE AND CYNTHIA" port side - point of impact.
"CONNIE AND CYNTHIA" point d'impact - côté bâbord.


"CONNIE AND CYNTHIA"
STOPPED - HAULING IN LOBSTER TRAPS
A ARRÊTÉ DE RENTRER LES CASIERS À HOMARD
APPROXIMATELY 112½°
ENVIRON 112½°
POINT OF IMPACT APPROXIMATELY 4' FROM STEM
POINT D'IMPACT- ENVIRON À 4' DE L'ÉTRAVE
"SEVEN KINGS III"
NORTH NORTH-WESTERLY DIRECTION-SPEED 5-6 Kn
EN DIRECTION NORD-NORD-OUEST À UNE VITESSE DE 5 À 6 Kn
N

"ATLANTIC SHAKER"

Fire and total loss, south-east coast of N.S.
June 13, 1989

Summary

The 42 gross ton, 12.53 m, Canadian fishing vessel "ATLANTIC SHAKER", with a crew of 5, departed Shelburne, N.S., June 8, 1989, bound for the fishing grounds. In the early morning hours of June 13, in light breeze and good weather, the fishing gear was laid in a position south-east of Baccaro Bank. Some 4 - 4 1/2 hours later, the vessel commenced hauling in the gear using a hydraulically-powered winch.

At about 1030, black coloured smoke was seen coming from an engine-room ventilator. To investigate the source of this smoke, the skipper opened the access hatch between the wheel-house and the engine-room, and was faced with dense smoke followed by heat and flame. His efforts to secure the access hatch were unsuccessful. The release mechanism in the wheel-house for the CO_2 fire-extinguishing system to the engine-room, although accessible, was not used and no other attempt was made to fight the fire. Instead, the skipper attempted to transmit a distress call using one of the vessel's radiotelephones, whilst the crew prepared a liferaft. There were no other vessels in sight at that time.

Within a very short time, the wheel-house was reportedly filled with smoke of such density and fire of such ferocity that the skipper ordered the crew to abandon the vessel.

A liferaft had been inflated and was boarded without mishap or injury by the crew. On June 15, a Canadian Forces aircraft on a routine flight spotted the liferaft and initiated a SAR operation. At 1430, the crew were rescued by a USSR registered vessel the "STERE GUSCHITY", subsequently transferred to CCGS "MARY HICHENS" and eventually disembarked at Shelburne at 2130.

A typical value for a vessel such as the "ATLANTIC SHAKER" is in the order of $250,000.

Findings

Whilst fishing on the Baccaro Bank and engaged in hauling back her gear, the small Canadian longliner "ATLANTIC SHAKER" experienced a fire in the engine-room, was abandoned and was presumed to have sunk, in good weather conditions. The sinking of the vessel precluded her examination and consequently the precise cause of the fire is unknown, however, of the probable causes it would appear that either a leak in the hydraulic pipe/fittings or the main engine fuel pipe/fittings may have


NEW BRUNSWICK
CHATHAM
MONCTON
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
CHARLOTTETOWN
CAPE BRETON ISLAND
SYDNEY
FREDERICTON
NOVA SCOTIA
HALIFAX
YARMOUTH
NOVA SCOTIA / NOUVELLE-ÉCOSSE
65°00'W
45°00'N
BAY
HALIFAX
BASIN
EMERALD
Yarmouth
Cape Rosewa
Cape Sable
LAHAVE BASIN
SABLE
BROWNS BANK
CHANNEL
CANADA
UNITED STATES ETATS-UNIS
(See NOTE A Voir NOTE A)
"ATLANTIC SHAKER"
FIRE 10:30
JUNE 13, 1989
"ATLANTIC SHAKER"
INCENDIE À 10:30
LE 13 JUIN 1989
5 SURVIVORS TRANSFERED TO CCGS "MARY HICHENS"
16:25 JUNE 15, 1989
5 SURVIVANTS TRANSFÉRÉS SUR LE NGCC "MARY HICHENS"
À 16:25 LE 15 JUIN 1989
"STERE GUSHCHIY"
PICKED UP
5 SURVIVORS
14:30
JUNE 15, 1989
"STERE GUSHCHIY"
REPÊCHE
5 SURVIVANTS
À 14:30
LE 15 JUIN 1989
"ATLANTIC SHAKER"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No.4001
DEPTHS IN METRES
SECTION DE LA CARTE N°4001 DU SHC
PROFONDEURS EN MÈTRES

caused hydraulic/diesel oil to come in contact with hot surfaces thus causing fire.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the rapid spread of fire and the resultant loss of the vessel:

- the intensity of fire developed suddenly;
- no attempt was made to activate the CO_2 system;
- the opening of the hatch cover allowed fresh air to enter the engine-room thus fuelling the fire;
- it was not possible to firmly replace the hatch cover to the engine-room; and
- no attempt was made to seal off ventilation to the engine-room.

Other findings

Inspection of the engine-room was infrequent.

Although a distress message was transmitted by the "ATLANTIC SHAKER", no such message was received by any receiving station.

The distress message was probably transmitted on SSB 2138 MHz, rather than the designated distress frequency of 2182 MHz.

The crew had no formal training or practice in emergency procedures or fire fighting.

No voyage plan had been submitted and no other person, outside of the vessel, was aware that the vessel had changed her proposed area of fishing.

The radio station aboard the "ATLANTIC SHAKER" was not properly licensed.

None of the crew aboard the "ATLANTIC SHAKER" held a Radiotelephone Operator's Restricted Certificate (Maritime).

"ATLANTIC SHAKER"

"WEST AWAY"

Capsize and subsequent sinking, Beauchemin Channel, B.C., June 17, 1989.

Summary

The 14 gross ton, 11.43 m "WEST AWAY" was a typical Canadian West Coast troller/longliner of closed construction with a general work area aft. The vessel, with a crew of 3, had sailed from Shearwater, B.C., June 14, 1989 for fishing grounds off Aristazabal Island, B.C. in good weather conditions.

On June 17, 1989, with a catch of some 2 t of snapper in the fish hold and with a gale warning forecast for the southern part of Hecate Strait, the vessel continued to fish in a steadily deteriorating weather conditions. The stabilizer poles were deployed; the port pole was in the outboard position whilst the starboard pole was secured inboard. Around 1250, with some 10 minutes left for the fishing gear to be onboard, the operator proceeded to the galley to prepare a meal; the deck-hand was left in charge of hauling in the remaining fishing gear and maintaining the vessel's head into the sea.

The winds were steadily increasing in force and the seas were building. At 1300, the vessel, broadside to the swell, was struck on the starboard side by a large swell. This rolled the vessel far enough to port submerging the port bulwark thereby enabling the seawater tc flood the afterdeck. Before she could recover, she was struck by a second wave causing the vessel to lay on her port beam ends. Seawater downflooded into the cabin through the open cabin door and into the forecastle and engine compartment. The unsecured fish hold hatch cover was displaced and seawater downflooded into the fish hold.

The operator transmitted a "MAYDAY" on VHF chanel 16 but the message was not heard by any station. Meanwhile, a liferaft had been launched and following minor problems it was inflated and boarded by the crew of 3. The liferaft drifted away from the vessel and was eventually paddled into a sheltered cove on an un-named island. The crew, now marooned on the island, were eventually spotted and rescued by a Canadian Coast Guard helicopter which was on a light-house resupply mission on June 19, 1989.

The casualty resulted in minor injuries to the owner/operator and the vessel, with an estimated replacement cost of $300,000, is considered a total loss.

Findings

On the afternoon of June 17, 1989, while engaged in retreiving longlines, the fishing vessel "WEST AWAY" capsized, downflooded and sank in poor weather conditions off Aristazabal Island, B.C.


"WEST AWAY"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No.3737
SECTION DE LA CARTE N°3737 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS
PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES
POSITION RAFT DRIFTED ASHORE
POSITION OÙ LE RADEAU À DÉRIVÉ À TERRE
CAPSIZE POSITION
POSITION DU CHAVIREMENT
BRITISH COLUMBIA
PRINCE RUPERT
KITIMAT
PRINCE GEORGE
VANCOUVER
VANCOUVER ISLAND
NANAIMO
VICTORIA
Armaga I°
S Armaga
Thistleton I°
Breakwater P°
Wiveeam Bay
Chart, Carte 3710
50°30'N
Rogerson R°
Murray R°
Cummins I°
Rylatt R°
Haynes R°
Munro I
Prior
10'
05'
129° 00'
Adjoining Chart / Carte adjacente 3726

The sinking of the vessel precluded her examination and consequently the precise cause of the casualty cannot be determined, however, the following factors may have contributed to the loss of the vessel:

- the vessel fished in steadily deteriorating weather conditions even though a gale warning was in effect;
- the deployment of only the port stabilizer somewhat retarded the vessel's recovery from her roll to port;
- the operator had left the conduct of the vessel to a deck-hand in order to prepare a meal in the galley;
- being preoccupied with hauling in the fishing gear, the deck-hand allowed the vessel to lay beam-to the swell;
- a large swell struck the vessel on the starboard side causing her to heel to port far enough for the port bulwark to enter the water;
- the added weight of water prevented the vessel from returning to an upright position;
- a second swell struck the vessel before she could recover causing her to lay on her port beam ends;
- seawater gained unrestricted access to the interior through the open cabin door and downflooded into the forecastle and engine-room compartments; and
- the unsecured fish hold hatch cover was displaced allowing seawater to enter the fish hold.

Other Findings

The liferaft was one (1) year overdue for inspection, the vessel's distress signals were outdated and there were no D.O.T approved lifejackets on board.

The vessel did not have a sailing plan and was not expected to return to port until June 23, 1989.

"WEST AWAY"

Liferaft used by crew to abandon ship.

Radeau de sauvetage que l'équipage a utilisé pour abandonner le bateau.

"OCEAN SELECTOR"/"E.J. SAFARIK"

Collision in Broughton Strait, B.C.
July 24, 1989.

Summary

"OCEAN SELECTOR"

The 453 gross ton, 42.43 m Canadian stern trawler "OCEAN SELECTOR" departed Nanaimo, B.C., July 23, 1989, with a crew of 6 and 4 DFO biologists, to conduct a survey of ground-fish species off the Queen Charlotte Islands. The bridge was manned by a senior deck-hand in charge of navigation and a look-out. At about 0320, July 24, in calm seas, no wind and good visibility in darkness, the vessel was about 1 mile from Gordon Bluff and slightly to the south of the centre of the strait when the navigation lights of a vessel, later identified to be the "E.J. SAFARIK" were sighted visually and her echo sighted on radar about 2 miles ahead and slightly to starboard. Reportedly, owing to the presence of other small fishing vessels on her starboard side, the senior deck-hand on watch decided to keep to the port side of the channel. Thus, a series of minor course alterations to port were carried out but no attempt was made to establish VHF R/T contact with the "E.J. SAFARIK". When the vessels were about 50 m apart, the auto-pilot was disengaged, the engine throttled down and attempts made to engage reverse propulsion. This action was too late and both vessels collided at 0330 when the bow of the "OCEAN SELECTOR" came in contact with the port quarter of the "E.J. SAFARIK". She sustained minor damage and repairs were estimated to cost $10,000.

"E.J. SAFARIK"

The 110 gross ton, 19.81 m Canadian stern trawler "E.J. SAFARIK", with a catch of some 70 t of salmon, was enroute from Queen Charlotte Sound to Vancouver, B.C.. The vessel, with the engineer/deck-hand alone on the bridge, was heading on a course of 118° (T) at a speed of about 8 knots. Shortly after passing Alert Rock light, the navigation lights of an approaching vessel, later identified to be the "OCEAN SELECTOR" were sighted visually and her radar target observed to be 1.25 miles off the port bow. The engineer/deck-hand, without attempting to establish VHF R/T contact with the "OCEAN SELECTOR", made a series of minor course alterations to starboard on the auto-pilot. When both vessels were less than 50 m apart and collision was imminent, a last minute evasive action comprising reduction in speed and helm hard-to-port was taken but both vessels collided. She sustained substantial damage and repairs were estimated to cost $90,000.


NOTE: TRACKS ARE APPROXIMATE ONLY
NOTA: LES SILLAGES SONT APPROXIMATIFS SEULEMENT
"OCEAN SELECTOR"/
"E J SAFARIK"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No.3546
SECTION DE LA CARTE N°3546 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN METRES
PROFONDEURS EN MÈTRES
P1 POSITIONS OF VESSELS WHEN "OCEAN SELECTOR" FIRST SIGHTED "E J SAFARIK"
P1 POSITION DES BATEAUX QUAND LE "OCEAN SELECTOR" A APERÇU LE "E J SAFARIK" POUR LA PREMIÈRE FOIS
TRACK OF "E J SAFARIK" SILLAGE DU "E J SAFARIK"
TRACK OF "OCEAN SELECTOR" SILLAGE DU "OCEAN SELECTOR"
COLLISION POSITION POSITION DE L'ABORDAGE
CORMORANT ISLAND
PEARSE PASSAGE
Alert Bay
Gordon Bluff
Leonard Pt
Thiemer Cr
Lewis Pt
Englewood
Telegraph Cove
Inset/Cartouche
Airfield/Aérodrome
50°35'N
126°55'W
126°50'W
NCOUVER ISLAND
DE VANCOUVER

Findings

The large Canadian fishing vessel "OCEAN SELECTOR" and the small Canadian fishing vessel "E.J. SAFARIK" were involved in a collision on July 24, 1989 in good weather conditions with clear visibility in darkness due to non-observance of certain provisions of the Collision Regulations.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the collision:

Both Vessels

- crews on watch did not have any formal training in radar operation;

- crews made no attempt to establish VHF R/T contact with each other to arrange a safe passage;

- waited until it was too late before taking evasive actions and these actions were not positive;

- master/skipper were not advised that a potentially dangerous situation was developing; and

- did not use appropriate sound signals to indicate course alterations were made.

"OCEAN SELECTOR"

- being the give-way vessel, made a series of small course alterations to port; and

- crew on watch did not fully appreciate the significance of the relative bearing between the two vessels not appreciably changing.

"E.J. SAFARIK"

- being the stand-on vessel, made a series of course alterations to starboard.

"OCEAN SELECTOR"

"E J SAFARIK

"LE DANY-CINDY"

Fire and subsequent sinking, off Miscou Island, July 27, 1989.

Summary

The 12.7 m long, 20 gross ton, wooden Canadian fishing vessel "LE DANY-CINDY" was built in 1980 and was in possession of a valid Steamship Inspection Certificate. Included in her fire-fighting equipment were a main engine-driven pump with a capacity of 300 L/min, a 200 L/min electric pump and 3 dry chemical fire-extinguishers.

"LE DANY-CINDY" was fishing for cod off Miscou Island, N.B., July 27, 1989. After setting the nets in the water, the deck-hand prepared to hose down the after deck. As the owner opened the hatch to enter the engine compartment to go down and start the pump, thick black smoke billowed out of the compartment. The owner evacuated the wheel-house shouting "fire". He was neither able to establish the location nor the intensity of the fire and without looking any further, the crew of 2 launched the inflatable liferaft. Then the owner, without entering the wheel-house, reached for the VHF R/T mike and using channel 9 called another fishing vessel "FRANÇOIS G2" requesting assistance. After establishing communication, the vessel was abandoned, the liferaft boarded and moved clear of the vessel. Some 15 minutes later, at 0740, the crew was rescued by the "FRANÇOIS G2". Reportedly, as the fire was burning intensely, the "FRANÇOIS G2" stood by until 1200 when the "LE DANY-CINDY" sank in 50 m of water in position 47°47'27"N 64°15'00"W.

A typical estimated value of such a vessel was $70,000.

Findings

Whilst engaged in fishing operations off Miscou Island in fair weather conditions, fire broke out in the engine compartment aboard the "LE DANY-CINDY" on July 27, 1989; the precise origin of the fire is unknown. The sinking of the vessel precluded her examination and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, of the several options it would appear probable that a leak in the fuel/hydraulic line/fitting resulted in oil spraying on the hot surfaces in the engine compartment thus starting the fire.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the rapid spread of fire and eventual sinking of the vessel:

- no attempt was made to fight the fire;
- neither the engine compartment access door nor the ventilation to the compartment were shut off;



"LE DANY-CINDY"

SECTION OF CHS CHART No.4024

SECTION DE LA CARTE N°4024 DU SHC

DEPTHS IN FATHOMS

PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES

- fuel supply to the main engine was not cut off.

Other Findings

None of the crew members aboard the "LE DANY-CINDY" had taken a Marine Emergency Duties course.

Lack of periodic inspection of the engine compartment precluded detection of fire in the earlier stage.

"PAUL MAURICE"

Fire and subsequent sinking off Tracadie, N.B.
August 29, 1989.

Summary

The 11 gross ton, 11.36 m small scallop dragger of open construction "PAUL MAURICE" was equipped with a hydraulic winch and was propelled by a 292 h.p. gasoline engine. The vessel, equipped with a CB, departed Val Comeau, N.B. at 0600, August 29, 1989 and upon arrival at the fishing grounds offshore, commenced dragging for scallops. The winds were from the SW at 10 knots and the height of waves were 1 m. After departure, the winds started to increase in speed and a few of the fishing vessels abandoned fishing operations to seek shelter.

A flexible hydraulic hose connected the hydraulic winch on deck to a winch-engine in the engine compartment. Later that morning, the hydraulic hose coupling connection to the winch-engine became detached spilling hydraulic oil all over the engine compartment including the main engine. The spillage was cleaned with rags and all openings to the engine compartment were kept open for ventilation. The vessel continued fishing operation and a few minutes later smoke was seen coming out of the engine compartment. At about 1000, the same flexible hose coupling connection once again became detached causing the hydraulic oil to spill and come in contact with the hot main engine exhausts, initiating the fire. The operator, attempted to extinguish the fire using a dry chemical fire extinguisher but he was unable to extinguish the fire under the main engine.

Meanwhile, the deck-hand transmitted a message on CB radio seeking assistance from the "PATRICE II" which was fishing near by. The "PATRICE II" ceased fishing operations and proceeded towards the "PAUL MAURICE". The crew of 2 then abandoned the "PAUL MAURICE" by jumping into the water with only the operator wearing his personal PFD. They swam away from the burning vessel and were rescued some half hour later by the "PATRICE II" about 0.25 nautical mile away from the "PAUL MAURICE".

The vessel, having burnt to the waterline, is presumed to have sunk. An estimated value of such a vessel is $10,000.

Findings

On August 29, 1989, a flexible hose coupling connection to the winch-engine aboard the small Canadian fishing vessel "PAUL MAURICE" became detached causing hydraulic oil to spray/spill and come in contact with the hot main engine exhausts. A fire broke out and resulted in the total loss of the vessel.


55'
64°50'
45'
40'
35'
47°
30'
SEPT-ILES
CAMPBELLTON
NEW BRUNSWICK
CHATHAM
MONCTON
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
CHARLOTTETOWN
SYDNEY
FREDERICTON
NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK
TRACADIE
Pte à Chaudron
BAIE
Tracadie Beach
Old Tracadie Gully
Tracadie Gully
Balisé/Buoyed
FIG
FIR
Ile au Cheval
SHEILA
FIG 3s12m5M
Big Tracadie River
The Lake
Val-Comeau
Pointe à Barreau
Voir ATTENTION No
See CAUTION No
APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF FIRE
LIEU APPROXIMATIF DE L'INCENDIE
7930 W 13300
5930 X 15000
7930 W 13280
010
005
305
295
285
990
985
S Sh
"PAUL MAURICE"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4906
SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 4906 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN METRES
PROFONDEURS EN MÈTRES

It would appear that the following factors contributed to casualty:

- the condition of the flexible hose coupling was such that it permitted the coupling to become detached;

- the recurring problem respecting the detachment of the flexible hose coupling was not adequately rectified; and

- the limited fire-extinguishing equipment required and on board the "PAUL MAURICE" restricted the vessel's ability to fight fire of that magnitude.

Other Findings

It would appear that the operator of the "PAUL MAURICE" kept the CB R/T mike transmission switch depressed whilst seeking assistance from the "PATRICE II"; this precluded the receipt of a response aboard the "PAUL MAURICE"

It was fortuitous that "PATRICE II" was in the vicinity of the casualty when the crew were forced to abandon the vessel into the water.

"MARCY & SISTERS"/"BACCALIEU CHALLENGER"

Collision off Cape Race, Nfld., August 4, 1989.

Summary

"MARCY & SISTERS"

On August 4, 1989, the 36 gross ton, 15.58 m wooden fishing vessel "MARCY & SISTERS" had set her gill net in the area of Eastern Shoal. Whilst awaiting daylight, in fine weather and good visibility, she exhibited a masthead light, sidelights and fishing lights. The vessel was stopped in the water and heading generally in a SE'ly direciton. The skipper was alone in the wheel-house and had neither sighted the "BACCALIEU CHALLENGER" visually nor on her radar. At about 0420 both vessels were involved in a collision when the stem of the "BACCALIEU CHALLENGER" came in contact with the port quarter of the "MARCY & SISTERS". She sustained some damage on her port side above the waterline.

"BACCALIEU CHALLENGER"

The 94 gross ton, 18.44 m wooden fishing vessel, "BACCALIEU CHALLENGER" had set her gill net on the Eastern Shoal on August 4, 1989. Whilst awaiting daylight to retrieve her nets, the vessel, displaying her navigation and fishing lights, was steering a course of about 166°(T) on auto-pilot and proceeding at about 2 knots. The skipper was alone in the wheel-house and neither saw the "MARCY & SISTERS" visually nor on her radar until collision and consequently no collision avoidance action was taken. She sustained minimal damage to the stem and starboard bow.

Events following collision

Both vessels assessed damage and returned safety to their respective home ports on August 5. There was neither injury nor pollution as a result of the casualty. Estimated cost of repairs to the "MARCY & SISTERS" was $10,000.

Findings

While waiting for daylight, in fine weather, with a light southerly breeze, smooth seas and good visibility, to retrieve their fishing nets, "MARCY & SISTERS" and "BACCALIEU CHALLENGER" were involved in a collision, due to a failure by both vessels to observe certain provisions of the Collision Regulations.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the collision:



"MARCY & SISTERS"/
"BACCALIEU CHALLENGER"

SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4001 / SECTION DE LA CARTE N°4001 DU SHC

DEPTHS IN METRES / PROFONDEURS EN MÈTRES

Both Vessels

- did not maintain a proper look-out and in so doing did not establish if risk of collision existed;

- crews had suffered a degree of fatigue; and

- VHF R/Ts were not used to advantage in that neither vessel attempted to contact the other to arrange a safe passage.

"BACCALIEU CHALLENGER"

- being the give-way vessel and underway, she did not keep out of the way of the "MARCY & SISTERS".

"MARCY & SISTERS"

- did not exhibit her sternlight; and

- being the stand-on vessel, she did not take appropriate action as would best aid to avoid collision when collision with the "BACCALIEU CHALLENGER" was imminent.

Other Findings

The "MARCY & SISTERS" was fishing some 120 miles offshore when her Steamship Inspection Certificate limited her operation to 60 miles off-shore.

The "MARCY & SISTERS" was in possession of a valid Steamship Inspection certificate but

(a) her sidelights were partially obscured from 2 points abaft the beam to 2 points forward of the beam on their respective sides; and

(b) her all-round lights and sidelights were in poor state of repair and she neither had a sternlight nor was a bracket fitted for the sternlight.

The "MARCY & SISTERS" carried a crew in excess of that stipulated on her certificate but did not have on board sufficient life-saving equipment.

The "MARCY & SISTERS" had no radio equipment capable of transmitting/receiving under 'normal' conditions to the nearest shore station from her fishing grounds some 120 miles off the coast.

Neither the skipper nor any crew member aboard the "MARCY & SISTERS" held a Radiotelephone Operator's Restricted Certificate (Maritime).



Scuff marks on stem and starboard bow of "BACCALIEU CHALLENGER".

Éraflures sur l'étrave et du côté tribord du "BACCALIEU CHALLENGER".

"MARCY & SISTERS"

"WAYNE & DOROTHY"/"WANDA MARIE"
Collision in St. Lawrence Harbour,
Nfld., August 3, 1989.

Summary

"WAYNE & DOROTHY"

The 19 gross ton, 13.71 m longliner "WAYNE & DOROTHY" was not in possession of a valid SIC 29 certificate. After a catch of some 770 kg of crab, the vessel departed fishing grounds on August 2, 1989. At 0042, upon inquiring, the skipper was advised by St. Lawrence CGRS that there was no known traffic within harbour limits. The bridge was manned by the skipper, a helmsman and a look-out. The vessel, with the radar set on 3-mile range and no moving target displayed on the PPI, reduced speed to 4 knots off C. Chapeau Rouge and then to 2 knots due to one cable visibility in thick fog. A NNW course favouring the port side of the channel was steered. She exhibited her navigation lights and was fitted with a radar reflector but no fog signals were sounded.

When off Blue Beach Cove, the navigation lights of a vessel, later identified to be the "WANDA MARIE", were sighted on the starboard bow some 100 m away. Attempts to establish VHF R/T communications were unsuccessful. Upon realizing that the other vessel had now altered course and that collision was imminent, the engine was placed to full astern and helm hard to port, but both vessels collided. Her bow struck the port side midship section of the "WANDA MARIE".

"WANDA MARIE"

Shortly before 0100, August 3, 1989, the 10 gross ton, 10.66 m long fishing vessel "WANDA MARIE" departed from the wharf at St. Lawrence with a crew of 3 bound for the fishing grounds. Visibility was clear in the inner harbour. The vessel, with the operator alone in the wheel-house and the radar set on 0.5-mile range, proceeded at about 5 knots heading in a generally southerly direction and favouring the western side of the harbour. The operator noticed a radar target almost ahead and closing rapidly. As the vessel entered the fog bank, the radar target was lost and she altered course to starboard to West-South-West in order to give the approaching vessel a wider berth. Within seconds, the operator made visual contact with her lost radar target and before any action could be taken both vessels collided. She was fitted with a radar reflector and was displaying her navigation lights but no fog signals were sounded.

Events following the collision

Following collision, the "WANDA MARIE" towed the "WAYNE & DOROTHY" into port. Damage to both vessels were minor and the



NOTE:

1. THIS RECONSTRUCTION, DEPICTING THE MOST PROBABLE TRACKS OF VESSELS LEADING TO THE COLLISION, HAS BEEN COMPILED BY THE MARINE CASUALTY INVESTIGATIONS BRANCH.

2. ALL TRACKS AND POSITIONS ARE APPROXIMATE

NOTA:

1. LA DIRECTION DES ENQUÊTES SUR LES ACCIDENTS MARITIMES A RECONSTITUÉ LES ROUTES SUIVIES PAR LES NAVIRES. ON ESTIME QUE CE SONT CELLES QUI REPRÉSENTENT CELLES QUI AURAIENT LE PLUS VRAISEMBLABLEMENT CONDUIT À L'ABORDAGE.

2. TOUS LES SILLAGES ET POSITIONS SONT APPROXIMATIFS

estimated cost of repairs were $600 for the "WAYNE & DOROTHY" and $1,000 for the "WANDA MARIE".

Findings

The fishing vessels "WAYNE & DOROTHY" and "WANDA MARIE" were involved in a collision in darkness and dense fog in the Great St. Lawrence Harbour on August 3, 1989 due to non-observance of certain provisions of the Collision Regulations. It would appear that the following factors contributed to the collision:

Both Vessels

- radars were not used to advantage and consequently both vessels did not maintain a "proper look-out" and did not ascertain if "risk of collision" existed; and

- did not sound fog signals for a power-driven vessel under way.

"WAYNE & DOROTHY"

- in making her approach to the harbour, did not keep as far to starboard as was practical.

"WANDA MARIE"

- in conditions of poor visibility, had only one person on watch in the wheel-house, necessitating that the person had the responsibility of attending to the navigation, steering and keeping a look-out;

- upon sighting a radar target on a near reciprocal course, she did not attempt to establish VHF R/T contact to arrange a safe passage;

- did not take positive action in ample times to avoid collision; and

- upon losing the radar target, she altered course to starboard based on scanty radar information and in so doing altered course towards the "WAYNE & DOROTHY".

Other Findings

The "WAYNE & DOROTHY" was operating without a valid Steamship Inspection Certificate and the radio station was not licensed.



"WAYNE & DOROTHY"

"WANDA MARIE"

"DÉRALD JONES No. 3"

Capsizing with loss of one life off La Tabatière, Quebec, August 15, 1989.

Summary

The 5.18 long fibre-glass open boat "DÉRALD JONES No. 3" is of round bilge construction with a transom stern. She was propelled by a 40 h.p. outboard motor. Reserve buoyancy is provided by watertight tanks. There was neither life-saving appliance nor communication equipment aboard the vessel.

The "DÉRALD JONES No. 3" departed La Tabatière, Quebec, at 0700, August 15, 1989 bound for the fishing grounds some 4 miles offshore. Upon arrival at the fishing grounds, the boat was anchored near Iles-aux-Huards, Quebec, and the lone operator paid out the longlines. There were no other boats in the vicinity.

At about 1230, his brother returned from the fishing grounds and the "DÉRALD JONES No. 3" was not in sight. As the operator had not returned by about 1500, his brother became worried and contacted other fishing vessels that were on the fishing grounds on CB channel 9 and initiated a search. MRSC Quebec, upon being advised, co-ordinated the search.

At 1645, the "DÉRALD JONES No. 3" was sighted capsized some 0.5 mile south of Iles-aux-Huards. The boat was at anchor and the fishing gear was still attached to the capsized boat. The search for the operator continued until 1300 the following day with negative results and the case was handed over to the local police as a 'missing person' case.

Findings

Whilst at anchor and fishing off La Tabatière, Quebec, in good weather conditions, the small Canadian fishing vessel "DÉRALD JONES No. 3" was found capsized with the operator missing. In the absence of any eyewitness, the precise cause of the capsizing cannot be established but, of the options, it would appear that the boat capsized in strong tidal current whilst the operator was attempting to free the fishing line fouled on the seabed throwing the lone operator into the water.

It would appear that, having fallen overboard, the operator of the "DÉRALD JONES No. 3" lost his life due to the following contributing factors:

- the operator was fishing alone with no other vessels in the vicinity;

- he was a non-swimmer; and

- he was not wearing any form of PFD.

Other Findings

The boat was not equipped with any means of radio communication nor was she required to by regulations.

The boat was not equipped with the appropriate life-saving equipment.


58°55'W
50°50'N
CORNER BROOK
GANDER
CHANNEL PORT AUX BASQUES
ST JOHN'S
ILES AUX HUARDS
LOCATION OF CASUALTY
LIEU DU SINISTRE
"DÉRALD JONES No 3"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No.4474
SECTION DE LA CARTE N°4474 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS
PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES
Ile Ronde
Ile de Brador
Ilet au Bois
Ile du Vieux Canard
Ile Caribou
Ile à la Poule
Ile Commandeur
Blanc
Ile Maillous
La Tabatière
Vieux-Poste
Ile du Vieux Poste
Ile Godin
Petite Ile Godin
Lac Charles
Pte Rouge

Glossary

Beaching	Intentionally putting a vessel (partly) ashore for the purpose of cleaning or repairing the hull or preventing its sinking in deep water
CCG	Canadian Coast Guard
CCGC	Canadian Coast Guard Cutter
CCGS	Canadian Coast Guard Ship
CGRS	Coast Guard Radio Station
CMRA	Canadian Marine Rescue Auxiliary
Cable	One tenth of a nautical mile
ETA	Estimated time of arrival
FPV	Fisheries Patrol Vessel
FV	Fishing Vessel
Fish Packers	Fishing vessels being used only for transportation of fish
Free surface effect	Whenever there is a surface of liquid which is free to move, there is a loss of effective GM due to a virtual rise of the vessel's centre of gravity and the loss of stability caused by the movement of liquid in partially filled compartments when the vessel rolls. This movement may involve a large shift of weight.
Freeboard	The distance between the waterline and the upper edge of the weather deck.
(G)	Gyro
GM	The distance between the transverse metacentre and the vertical centre of gravity, and is an indication of a vessel's ability to right herself when heeled over.

Limber holes	Holes in the lower part of vertical plates for drainage purposes
M	Magnetic
MRSC	Marine Rescue Sub-Centre
MAYDAY	Distress signal
MEDEVAC	The urgent evacuation of a person from a vessel for medical reasons
PAN	Prefix to urgency message
Port of refuge	A reasonably safe place of retreat from winds or storms
r.p.m.	Revolutions per minute
RCC	Rescue Co-ordination Centre
SAR	Search and Rescue
SFV	Small fishing vessel
SIC	Steamship Inspection Certificate
SSB	Single sideband radio
T	True
Traffic separation scheme	Routeing system designed to avoid marine collisions
Trim	The difference between the draught forward and aft
USCG	United States Coast Guard
VHF	Very high frequency radio